Why is the EU, which just yesterday called Ukraine a strategic partner, now putting our agro-export back under quota restrictions? Journalist and agricultural expert Volodymyr Chopenko discusses with agronews.ua how the closure of the European “ATM” could cost Ukraine billions of dollars annually.
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EU LIGHTHOUSE for Ukrainian Agricultural Products
Going “green”!
Remember that initial surge? That first, hopeful flash of unity? When on June 4, 2022, three months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, the EU, in solidarity with us, fully opened its markets to Ukrainian agricultural products. No duties, no quotas, no trade barriers! The preamble of the enabling document, Regulation (EU) 2022/870 of the European Parliament and of the Council, transcribed the introduction of temporary trade liberalization measures as follows: “The exceptional situation in Ukraine resulting from the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation justifies the acceleration of efforts to facilitate closer economic relations between the Union and Ukraine in order to provide stable and predictable support for Ukraine’s economy.”
Since then, the abbreviation ATM (Autonomous Trade Measures) has become commonplace – autonomous trade measures. But ATM is also an ATM (abbreviation from Automated Teller Machine). And this play on words was not accidental. It was a kind of “ATM” – duty-free access to the EU market worth 1.4 billion euros annually. Agricultural products, which account for over 60% of Ukraine’s exports, became a “golden bridge” for the survival of the economy. It was a symbol: quick, unhindered access to the European market, to European money, to European breathing room for the Ukrainian economy suffocating from war. The green light of the EU “lighthouse” allowed the Ukrainian agro-sector to find vital alternative sales routes under fire when traditional Black Sea routes proved to be deadly.
In ATM, I see a kind of Silk Road for agriculture. It became not just an economic tool, but a symbol of hope, a confirmation of belonging to the European family in the darkest times for us. Ukrainian farmers, despite all the incredible difficulties – minefields, fuel shortages, destroyed infrastructure, mobilization of agricultural workers – managed to survive largely thanks to this “ATM.” They were not withdrawing money, but hope and resources to continue the fight both on the front lines and in the fields.
Comparing the pre-war period statistics and the years 2022-2025, when ATM was in effect, reports from industry associations shout out! They signal that ATM has become a powerful catalyst for Ukraine’s agro-exports to the EU. Especially for those sectors that previously faced high barriers (out-of-quota imports of chicken, eggs, sugar, oil). During the ATM period, the export of these food products in terms of volume and value doubled or quadrupled in peak years.
The EU has transformed from a secondary to a dominant market for chicken, eggs, sugar, and flour (50-80% share during ATM) and significantly increased the share for oilseeds (40-50%) and dairy products (30-35%). During this period, Ukraine underwent logistical restructuring: ATM revitalized land and river sales corridors, as evidenced, for example, by the movement of flour and grain in 2022-2023.
Brake!
But on June 5, 2025, the EU lighthouse blinked and changed its color from permissive green to a cautionary yellow with a clearly outlined red border of duties beyond the quotas. Why did the EU, which still in 2023 called Ukraine a “strategic partner,” suddenly return to pre-war rules? This decision truly shocked the upper echelon of the Ukrainian government. Well, it was not prepared to hear such a verdict: the EU officially reinstates tariff quotas on major agricultural products from Ukraine. The duty-free regime, the same ATMs that became a lifeline for many, has ended. From now on, there will be restrictions on the export of grains, poultry meat, eggs, sugar, oilseeds (including rapeseed). Anything beyond the established limits will be subject to standard EU duties. It was not prepared to hear, but it knew for certain that on June 5, 2025, the “gravy train” was over.
The European Union introduced Autonomous Trade Measures (ATM) on June 4, 2022, with a one-year term – until June 5, 2023. This term was clearly stipulated in Regulation (EU) 2022/870, which stated that the measures were temporary to support Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion. In June 2023, according to Regulation (EU) 2023/1077, ATM was extended for another year – until June 5, 2024. The second extension came in May 2024. The EU adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1392, which extended preferences for Ukrainian agricultural products until June 5, 2025. The document emphasized that this was the final extension, and after this date, the provisions of Article 29 of the Association Agreement (DCFTA) would come into force. It also stated that further trade liberalization after June 5, 2025, would require new negotiations.
Therefore, from the very beginning, the EU viewed ATM as a temporary instrument, not a permanent mechanism. Even during the last extension, the focus was on the need to “gradually return to the rules of the DCFTA.” The conditions of the DCFTA (Article 29) provide for much stricter quotas for Ukrainian agricultural exports compared to ATM.
So I would not blame the EU entirely. The terms of ATM were clearly spelled out in official EU documents from the start, and their expiration was set for June 5, 2025. This date presented challenges for Ukraine, as there were no ready alternative agreements in place at the time of the preferential trade suspension. The government naively hoped that the EU would continue the preferences indefinitely: if it had gone out of its way three times, it would go a fourth time… The war is ongoing! Therefore, the benefits should continue… However, Ukrainian “logic” failed.
Why, exactly, did the Ukrainian side not intensify negotiations to revise the terms of Article 29 of the DCFTA during 2023-2024? Early negotiations could have secured more favorable conditions. While Poland, Hungary, and France were pressing the EU to protect their farmers, Ukraine did not provide a strong counterbalance. Instead of actively seeking alternative sales markets (Asia, Africa, the Middle East), businesses and the government were content with the “Euro-inflows” from ATM. And when the EU closed the “ATM,” it turned out that exporting chicken to Asia was difficult due to high competition from Brazil, sugar did not reach Africa due to logistical costs, milk did not meet Middle Eastern standards… The farmers suffered the most from political inertia. They were convinced that the EU was buying, and suddenly – duties, quotas, closed borders. Why were they not warned? I repeat: the government officially knew that ATM was ending, but few believed it would actually happen.
Public comments from Ukrainian officials indicate that the EU’s decision was not just an economic blow but also a serious political surprise, even though they were aware of the change in regime. “What about the moral losses? This is not calculated in billions, but millions of Ukrainian citizens supporting integration into the EU,” said Vitaliy Koval, Minister of Agricultural Policy of Ukraine, during the AGRIFISH meeting in Brussels on May 27, 2025. His first deputy, Taras Vysotsky, announced on June 6, 2025, that if agreements with the European Commission were not reached, quotas could be exhausted by August-September… potentially halting key agricultural exports to the EU.
Instead of proactively preparing for the changes, Ukraine found itself in reactive management mode. Consequently, urgent measures were needed: to urgently redistribute quotas among agricultural players, accelerate the search for alternative sales markets, and urgently start negotiations with the EU on “flexible frameworks” (Article 29 of the DCFTA).
EU Verdict
The EU has its own issues. It deliberately set a time limit – a one-year term for ATM with further extensions to promptly respond to reactions within the community. By the way, in all Regulations, the European Commission retained the right to apply “emergency restrictions” even during the ATM period if imports from Ukraine “threatened EU markets.”
When we say that the EU is an attractive market with 160 million consumers, an economically active segment for Ukrainian exports, we must consider that they are not just idle bystanders. Among them are producers of the same line of foods that we supply there. How will they react to competition from outside? And they immediately began to protest. Loudly and persistently. Their tractors blocked roads, and their voices annoyed EU commissioners. Therefore, the official reason for ending ATM for European bureaucracy sounds dry and convincing: pressure from farmers in EU countries. Some may be swayed by formal explanations. I decided to dig deeper.
When it comes to economic pressure, whether real or manipulative, farmers in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and France did feel the competition. Ukraine, with significantly lower production costs (land, labor, energy before the war), could offer products at a lower price. However, the scale of this pressure did not crush the entire EU territory. Complaints often concerned specific goods (grain, sugar, poultry) in specific border regions but were presented as a pan-European problem.
Indeed, a significant portion of Ukrainian grain, due to difficulties and costs for further transit deep into the EU, remained in border countries, creating local market saturation. At the same time, Ukraine became a convenient “lightning rod” for European farmers who shifted their own problems (increased energy costs, fertilizers, labor, strict Green Deal environmental policy) to the “culprit.” The narrative of “lower quality” or “non-compliance with standards” was also used to discredit Ukrainian products.
ATM interfered with electoral cycles in European countries, becoming a political thorn where the agricultural sector has significant weight in the electorate. In Poland, the issue of Ukrainian grain imports was particularly prominent in the 2025 presidential elections. Both candidates – Rafal Trzaskowski and Karol Nawrocki – publicly advocated for restrictions on Ukrainian agricultural imports. The far-right Confederation party (Konfederacja) – a right-wing radical party that had been organizing protests against Ukrainian grain imports since 2023 – actively exploited the theme of protecting Polish farmers and accused the EU of selling out Poland’s interests. Viktor Orban’s Hungarian government, the ruling Fidesz party, criticized the liberalization of trade with Ukraine relentlessly, both at the national level and in the context of the elections to the European Parliament.
The Slovak party SMER – social democracy (Robert Fico) during the 2023 parliamentary elections multiplied messages about unfair competition from Ukrainian farmers. In France, the issue of Ukrainian agro-exports, while not dominant, appeared in the rhetoric of far-right forces – the National Rally (Rassemblement National) – Marine Le Pen’s party during the European Parliament elections and local elections.
This negative sentiment partly influenced the European Commission’s decision to end ATM. Add to this the Kremlin’s constant disinformation campaign aimed at dividing the EU and discrediting Ukraine, including through the agricultural export issue. In short, administrative fatigue in Brussels, the desire for “normalization” to return to a more familiar, “orderly” trade regime, even if less advantageous for Ukraine in its current conditions, played a role. The deep protection of one’s own producer at any cost remains a strong instinct of national states, even within the EU. Therefore, EU solidarity with us turned out to be a commodity with an expiration date when it began to touch the pockets of their own voters. ATM, like any ATM, also had a withdrawal limit.
Sectoral Dissection
On the last day of June, Ukraine and the EU agreed on new trade terms under the future Association Agreement. Overall, they do not differ significantly from the pre-war rules. The same ones that existed before February 24, 2022. Rules that do not take into account the war, destruction, heroic efforts of Ukraine, or its unequivocal desire for the EU. The irony of fate: we are fighting for European values, but trading under rules that existed before this struggle took on an existential character.
According to forecasts, the potential decline in exports to the EU of the seven most valuable categories will be at the level of 50-80% already this year compared to the ATM peak. Part of the commodity positions will return to pre-war levels, while some will fall even lower. If we illustrate this with three categories: the export quota to the EU for 2025: chicken – 55.5 thousand tons, sugar – 109.4 thousand tons, eggs – 9.7 thousand tons. Whereas in 2023, we imported 171 thousand tons, 500 thousand, and 39.6 thousand tons, respectively. Moreover, we have already used part of the quotas allocated for 2025 in the first half of the year. With actual exports until the end of the year, only a dozen remains to be exported: chicken – 22.5 thousand tons, sugar – 24 thousand tons, and the egg quota is almost exhausted.
The cumulative potential losses of export revenue due to the return to a quota trade regime with the EU could reach billions of dollars by the end of 2025 alone. This is without taking into account the multiplicative effect. The reduction in farmers’ income, businesses will lead to a reduction in their expenses (on equipment, services, salaries). Consequently, this will hit adjacent sectors and consumer demand in the regions. Tax revenues to the budget will decrease in the face of colossal war expenses. A billion is not just a number. Behind it are unfinished farms, halted investments, reduced jobs. This means that the Ukrainian agricultural sector is once again forced to play by rules that do not consider the wartime context and the needs of recovery.
The EU lighthouse has changed its color. But the path to the global market is wider than the European one. We should not dwell on the yellow light of restrictions but use it as a signal to maneuver: diversify, reorient, improve quality and competitiveness. And continue to move forward. Because full European integration is not just a market but also standards, values, and long-term perspective. The traffic light will turn green again someday. The main thing is to keep moving. Cautiously, but not stopping. Because stopping is death for an export-oriented agricultural giant like Ukraine.